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BONUSES AND BRIBES: 
MOOD EFFECTS IN MEMORY 
ANN K. BOGGIANO 
University of Colorado 
PAULA T. HERTEL 
Trinity University 
Free recall of emotionally positive, neutral. and negative adjectives was used as 
an indirect assessment of the effects of reward on expectations about intrinsic 
interest. Reward for performing later activities described as interesting (a "bo­
nus" orientation) produced recall of a greater number of emotionally positive 
adjectives, whereas reward for the same activities described as boring (a "bribe" 
orientation) produced recall of a larger number of negative adjectives. A cued­
expectancy analysis suggests that reward serves to polarize initial attitude about 
forthcoming tasks; these polarized attitudes, like moods, influence the nature of 
words retrieved from memory. 
Recently, the interplay of social and cognitive psychology has provided 
some challenging questions and initial answers about the interaction of af­
fective and cognitive states. From one perspective, a number of research­
ers have been concerned primarily with the effect of mood on memory 
structures and processes (Bower, 1981; !sen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 
1978; Leight & Ellis, 1981). On the other side of this coin, much research 
has been directed at understanding how memory structures and processes 
affect social phenomena, such as person perception and attitude change 
(Hamilton, 1979). In this paper, we wish to emphasize the reciprocity of 
these two approaches to the study of social cognition. By juxtaposing a 
memory task and a manipulation of intrinsic interest and extrinsic reward, 
our intent was to show mood effects on memory and the dual implications 
that these effects might have for cognitive theory and a theory of attitude 
polarization. 
Attitude polarization has been proposed as an initial step in the cued-
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expectancy analysis of the effect of positive incentives on continued inter­
est in activities (Boggiano, 1981)-a phenomenon commonly referred to 
as the "overjustification effect" (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Lepper & Greene, 
1978; Pittman, Boggiano, & Ruble, 1983). According to cued expectan­
cy, reward affects subsequent interest in the following manner. First, re­
ward polarizes or strengthens initial expectations about the interest value 
of a forthcoming activity. That is, reward anticipated in the context of a 
task made to appear highly interesting should be interpreted as a bonus 
and should cue even more positive feelings about the activity to be per­
formed. Likewise, reward provided in the context of the same task made to 
appear uninteresting should be interpreted as a bribe and thus should in­
tensify negative feelings about the interest value of the task. Even in very 
young children, subsequent interest has been shown to depend on inter­
pretation of the meaning of reward (Boggiano, Narackiewicz, Main, & 
Bessette, 1983; Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Boggiano, Ruble, & Pittman, 
1982; Lepper, Sagotsky, Dafoe, & Greene, 1982; Pittman, Emery, & Bog­
giano, 1982). To illustrate this phenomenon, a valued prize provided for 
going on a blind date with an attractive partner would be expected to gen­
erate positive feelings and might even heighten expectations regarding en­
joyment. But the same incentive offered for dating an unattractive other 
might have the opposite effect. 
The second component of cued expectancy involves contrast effects 
produced because of these extreme standards of comparison against which 
the actual activity is evaluated. Polarized positive attitudes before task en­
gagement ultimately produce dissatisfaction and negative judgments about 
the actual activity, due to contrast with the high initial standard. Con­
versely, polarized negative attitudes before task engagement ultimately 
produce positive judgments about the same activity because of contrast 
with initially low standards. 
These predictions about the importance of internal states (e.g., feel­
ings or initial attitudes) on subsequent attitudes differ markedly from a 
self-perception analysis of the effect of reward on later interest. Since a 
self-perception analysis argues that final attitudes depend primarily on in­
terpretation of behavior and on the context in which the behavior occurs, 
direction or strength of initial attitudes (e.g., attitude about the interest 
value of the activity) should be irrelevant in determining later attitudes 
(Bern & McConnell, 1970; Greene, 1974). From a self-perception perspec­
tive, then, reward should decrease interest, regardless of whether the task 
is manipulated to be perceived as interesting or boring. Thus, the hypothe­
sized effect of strength or extremity of initial attitude in determining later 
attitude differs substantially from the self-perception model. Research 
testing these different predictions provides support for the cued-expectan­
cy model but not for the self-perception model (Boggiano, 1981). 
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However, although behavioral evidence has been provided for con­
trast as a component of this process, attitude polarization has received 
some support only from attitudinal evidence, in the form of shifts in rated 
interest. Since researchers in the area of the effect of rewards on interest 
have generally preterred unobtrusive measures of interest (e.g., behavioral 
measures) as opposed to less obtrusive attitudinal measures for several rea­
sons (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Pittman et al., 1982; Smith & Pittman, 1978), a 
more sensitive and perhaps more central way to examine the attitude po­
larization component of cued expectancy would be to assess the content of 
current thought and its relationship to a bribe-versus-bonus orientation. 
Since a bonus orientation may produce positive feelings, similarly positive 
information in memory should be more accessible than other information 
(lsen et al., 1978). Measuring anticipated interest in an activity by assess­
ing recall of material in memory unrelated to the target activity could 
therefore test attitude polarization unobtrusively and could also avoid po­
tential problems associated with examining interest by attitudinal meas­
ures. From a cued-expectancy perspective, then, reward provided in the 
context of an interesting task description, generating a bonus orientation, 
should make a good mood even better and should lead to increased recall 
of positive affective material in comparison to no-reward, interesting task 
control. In contrast, the feelings evoked by reward under circumstances 
associated with a bribe orientation would not be assumed to generate posi­
tive thoughts, but rather to facilitate the recall of emotionally negative ma­
terial. This analysis would suggest that content of current thought should be 
congruent with mood state determined by these different orientations. 
These predictions for differential effects of mood on memory, de­
pending on interpretation of the meaning of reward, are generally consis­
tent with other theoretical orientations to an affective-cognitive interac­
tion. For example, Bower's (1981) associative-network theory of emotion 
and memory would predict that negative or positive emotion nodes are 
primed by the bribe or bonus orientation and that activation from the 
emotion nodes would spread to word nodes labeling the emotion and to 
event nodes associated with the emotion. This spreading activation would 
thereby prime emotion-associated material in memory, making it more 
easily drawn upon than other information. Such a model for affective­
cognitive interactions is supported by a growing and diverse body of 
memory research (cf. Bower, 1981). 
However, much of the data can be explained by invoking the effect of 
cueing different categories on behavior (e.g., giving or not giving a gift), 
rather than the effect of mood on memory (lsen, 1982). For example, it is 
possible that the use of categories such as a gift versus no gift produced dif­
ferential recall of events, independent of mood state. One means of testing 
whether mood and not simply the cueing ot different categories accounts 
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for behaviors such as recall of positive versus negative events is to use the 
same category (e.g., a gift of money) to induce different mood states, de­
pending on condition. By using the paradigm of attitude polarization, the 
hypothesized effect of mood on memory would be supported if the effect 
of the same reward on recall of positive and negative events resulted from 
the feelings evoked by reward, depending on contextual conditions, and 
not from the mere presence or absence of reward. 
In the following experiment, the hypothesis that bribes and bonuses, 
depending on interpretation of reward, affect the content of current 
thought was assessed first by presenting a list of emotionally positive, neg­
ative, and neutral words before the manipulation of interest in an alleged 
forthcoming task (i.e., the target task), and then by requiring free recall of 
this list after the task description. The target task was described to subjects 
as either interesting or boring, or interest value was not described. In addi­
tion, subjects were either promised reward or given no such promise for 
performance in the forthcoming task. From the standpoint of a possible af­
fective-cognitive interaction, the recall frequency of emotionally positive 
and negative words was expected to vary according to conditions of inter­
est value and reward, thereby demonstrating attitude polarization on the 
one hand, and mood affects in memory on the other. 
METHOD 
SUBJECTS 
A total of 92 students (43 males and 53 females) from Fordham University 
were recruited on a volunteer basis to serve as subjects for an experiment 
allegedly concerned with decision making. Subjects were run individually 
by either a male or a female experimenter (both of whom were blind to the 
hypotheses) and randomly assigned to one of six between-subjects condi­
tions; two levels of reward (reward or no reward) were crossed with three 
levels of manipulated interest value of the activity to be performed (high, 
control, or low). The within-subjects factor of word type contained three 
levels (positive, neutral, or negative). 
MATERIALS 
Words for the memory task were selected from Anderson's (1968) likable­
ness ratings of personality-trait words. Eight positive words (e.g., ''kind," 
"friendly," "helpful") were chosen from words producing likableness 
ratings of 475 or above; the eight negative words (e.g., "cold," "hostile," 
"greedy") were rated 175 or below. Fourteen neutral words ("careful," 
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"thrifty," "quiet") produced likableness ratings between 400 and 200; six 
of the 14 neutral words were selected for the three beginning and the three 
end positions on the list (fillers), and were more extreme within the range 
of likable ratings. but were not scored at recall. All words received mean­
ingfulness ratings of 350 or above. Finally, we chose words producing a 
small ( < 1.00) variance in likableness ratings and counterbalanced word 
length within word type. 
Four different orders of the resulting list of 24 words were constructed 
(with the constant filler words at beginning and end). Word type was 
counterbalanced within blocks of six words, and consecutively occurring 
words of the same type were not permitted. These lists were then taped 
with a 2-second interval between words. 
PROCEDURE 
Subjects were told that they were participating in a study designed to test 
purportedly the effect of performing different activities on the decision­
making process. While one of a variety of activities was allegedly being 
prepared, the subject was approached in the waiting room and asked to 
help a graduate student with a short delayed-recall experiment. When the 
subject agreed (all did), a taped list of adjectives was presented with in­
structions to listen carefully. 
During the retention interval of 5 minutes, more information alleged­
ly concerning the decision-making task was provided. Subiects in the 
high-interest-value condition (cf. Boggiano, 1981) were told that, of the 
many different activities included in the study, they "fortunately" had 
been assigned to do an exciting task. Those in the low-interest-value con­
dition were told to expect an extremely tedious and monotonous activity. 
No information concerning task interest value was offered to subjects as­
signed to the control condition. Subjects selected to receive a reward were 
then given $1.50 for participation. (Those in the no-reward condition were 
paid the same amount during the debriefing.) Finally, before leaving the 
waiting room to participate in the alleged decision-making task, the sub­
ject was asked to engage in free recall of the list of words; guessing was en­
couraged. All subjects were debriefed and dismissed following recall and 
assessment of the manipulation of the interest value of the task. 
RESULTS 
RECALL 
The first three rows of Table 1 present the mean number of positive, neu­
tral, and negative words recalled by subjects in each condition of reward 
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TABLE 1 
Mean Number of Words of Each Type Recalled 
INTEREST VALUE 
INTERESTING NEUTRAL BORING 
NO NO NO 
WORD TYPE REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD REWARD 
Positive 3.43 2 .47 2 .50 2.00 2 .33 1.88 
Neutral 1.57 1.87 2 .13 1 .94 2.73 1.38 
Negative 1.71 2 .00 1.94 1.94 3.07 2 .13 
Positive minus 
negative words 1 .72 .47 .56 .06 -.74 -.25 
and interest value. The data from the mixed design were submitted to an 
analysis of variance, which revealed a reliable three-way interaction of 
word type, reward, and interest value, F (4, 172)=2.48, MS�= .995. (The 
significance level was set at .OS for all analyses.) This interaction corre­
sponds directly with our central prediction that the combination of reward 
and interest value produced a feeling (bonus or bribe) that, in turn, cued 
recall of mood-related material. The interaction of task conditions differ­
entially affected the type of words recalled. This three-way interaction is 
seen more easily in the last row of Table 1, which describes the difference 
between positive and negative word recall (omitting neutral words) for 
each between-subjects condition. An analysis of the effect of reward and 
three levels of interest value on positive words minus negative words re­
vealed a marginally significant interaction, F (2, 91)=2.94, MS.=l.92, 
p < .06; the interaction was reliable when the analysis included reward and 
two levels of interest value (excluding the neutral condition), F (1, 59)= 
6.24, MS.=1.92. Thus, reward was found to have different effects on the 
type of word recalled, depending on the interest value established for the 
task. 
Guided by predictions concerning the polarization effects of reward, 
further analyses explored differences within each condition of interest 
value, using all cells in the design. In the interesting-task condition, sub­
jects differentially recalled positive, neutral, and negative words, depend­
ing upon their expectation about reward, F (2, 172)=3.25, MS.=.995. 
Furthermore, reward facilitated the recall of positive words only, F (1, 
172) =4.99, MS.= .995. For the task condition in which interest value was 
not manipulated (neutral), differences were not statistically reliable, as ex-
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pected. And, although differences in the boring-task condition were not as 
large as those in the interesting-task condition, reward nevertheless in­
creased the recall of negative words, F (1, 172) =4.67, MSe =. 995. This dif­
ference, however, must be viewed somewhat cautiously, given the lack of 
a reliable interaction of word type with reward in the boring-task condi­
tion and the obvious facilitation for recall of neutral words in that condi­
tion. Yet, the reward effect on recall of negative words in the boring-task 
condition is suggestive, especially when it is compared to the other two 
task conditions, which show no increase on negative recall as a function of 
reward. In this vein, the interaction of reward with interest value for recall 
of negative wordswas reliable, F(2, 172)=3.14, MSe= .955. Thus, reward 
increased both the recall of emotionally positive words when subjects 
were expecting to participate in an interesting task, and the recall of emo­
tionally negative words when subjects believed a boring task was allegedly 
forthcoming. 
In addition to the three-way interaction, other reliable effects were re­
vealed by the overall analysis. First, the interest value of the task interact­
ed with word type, F (4, 172) =5.71, MSe= .995; an inspection of the mean 
suggests that subjects in the interesting task tended to recall more positive 
words, whereas those in the boring task recalled more negative words. 
Second, more positive words were recalled across all conditions, F (2, 
172)=5.84, MSe=.995; and reward facilitated recall, F (1, 86)=5.91, 
MSe=2.106. 
INTEREST MANIPULATION 
Table 2 presents the average rated interest in the forthcoming task for each 
experimental condition. The interest value of the task, as described, did in­
deed affect rated interest, F (2, 86) = 24.30, MSe = 18.325; and although the 
reward factor did not reliably interact with interest value, the trend was in 
the direction of differences in the memory task. Rated interest appeared to 
TABLE2 
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decrease for the boring task and increase for the interesting task when re­
ward was offered. The strength of the effect of reward on expectancies 
about task interest, in comparison to its effect on recall of positive or nega­
tive word type, may be due to demand characteristics. In the interest-rat­
ing task, subjects may have attempted to respond in a manner to verify the 
experimenter's description of the activity more than to reflect their mood. 
The strength of the main effect of interest value is consistent with this ex­
planation. 
DISCUSSION 
Two reciprocal conclusions emerge from these results. Qualitative differ­
ences in recall were established by nonreactive mood induction proce­
dures, and the nature of the recall differences support the attitude polari­
zation component of cued-expectancy theory. More specifically, subjects 
who were "bribed" with a reward to perform an allegedly uninteresting 
task recalled a larger number of negative words, presumably reflecting 
their "bad mood," whereas those receiving a bonus reward to perform an 
interesting task recalled a larger number of positive words, reflecting their 
"good mood." Clearly, the results suggest an important link between the 
attitude polarization effects of reward and the affective-cognitive interac­
tion known as mood state. Furthermore, unlike a number of previous find­
ings (e.g., Bower, 1981), the data are not easily interpreted by means of a 
demand explanation. 
From the standpoint of cued-expectancy theory, it is interesting to 
note that while differences in memory for affective material support the at­
titude polarization component, ratings of task interest did not. These dif­
ferences in behavioral versus attitudinal measures parallel findings in the 
overjustification literature (Pittman et al., 1982; Smith & Pittman, 1978). 
As suggested by a number of researchers (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Smith & Pittman, 1978), subjects may not have access to the processes that 
mediate their behavior. Thus, feelings about the activity to be performed 
may have been polarized without subjects being aware of their feelings. 
Alternatively, a demand explanation may account for subjects' responses 
in the interest-rating task. 
With regard to differences in memory for affective material, it would 
appear unlikely that subjects deliberated carefully about the effect reward 
had on their mood when retrieving information from memory. According 
to theoretical analyses of the effect of mood state on behavior (Clark & 
I sen, 1982), mood is assumed to influence judgment much of the time with-
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out conscious awareness. Such "automatic processing" effects may occur 
in a nonreflective manner and may affect our impressions of both people 
and objects (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1980; Zajonc, 1980). From 
this perspective, even thinking about favorable or unfavorable events 
may polarize attitudes about those events (e.g., Tesser, 1978), since 
thoughts congruent with affect associated with those events would come 
to mind and intensify initial attitude about the events. Thus, a feeling state 
may automatically activate affect-congruent thoughts about an event, 
which may both intensify initial feelings about that event and increase the 
likelihood that one will behave in a manner consistent with that feeling 
state. This line of reasoning suggests the process by which mood state may 
be maintained. 
Although automatic processing may account for the effect of positive 
mood state on behavior, it does not appear consistent with the body of re­
search examining the effect of negative feelings on judgments and behav­
ior. That is, while a positive feeling state has generally been found to in­
crease the probability of drawing upon positive material in memory and 
behaviors such as helping and generosity (Aderman, 1972; Batson, Coke, 
Chard, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; 
Isen, 1970; !sen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976; !sen & Levin, 1972; Levin & !sen, 
1975; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1973; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 
1973; Underwood, Froming, & Moore, 1977; Weyant, 1978), the effects of 
negative feeling states are far more complex. Some studies suggest that in­
ducing negative mood states increases the likelihood of antisocial behaviors 
(Baron, 1972; Baron & Bell, 1975), whereas others suggest that negative 
affect either has no effect or increases the likelihood of positive behaviors 
(Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini & 
Kenrick, 1976; !sen, 1970; McMillen, 1971; Mischel, Coates, & Raskoff, 
1968; Mischel & Moore, 1973; D. T. Reagan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972; 
J. W. Regan, 1971; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Underwood, Moore, & 
Rosenhan, 1973). 
The data on the effect of negative feeling states on behavior have been 
interpreted as suggesting that, unlike positive feeling states, in which 
mood is often automatically maintained, negative feeling states may well 
motivate people to control or change their mood state (Clark & !sen, 
1982). In this sense, people exposed to negative mood induction may at­
tempt to alter their mood state by thinking or behaving in a positive way. 
Although this analysis is consistent with the findings of much research, it 
does not explain why negative mood will increase the likelihood of antiso­
cial behaviors or make negative material from memory more accessible, as 
shown to some extent in the present study. 
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Although highly speculative, the following hypothesis is offered to 
account for the differential effects of negative mood states on judgments 
and behavior. The majority of studies manipulating negative mood state 
would appear to have produced shame, sadness, or depression. For exam­
ple, failure in a task would presumably induce feelings of shame or sadness 
(Isen et al., 1978). Other researchers have explicitly told subjects to think 
about sad events (e.g., Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Underwood et al., 1973) 
or have prompted subjects to commit some transgression (e.g., Cialdini et 
al., 1973). The results of this body of research indicate that subjects be­
haved in a positive way (e.g., helping), presumably to alleviate the shame 
or to compensate for failure. 
In contrast, negative mood states involving anger rather than sadness 
may produce somewhat different effects. Like individuals who feel sad or 
ashamed, those who feel angry may also be motivated to change their 
mood state. However, the strategy employed for this purpose may involve 
some form of catharsis; subjects may attempt to redirect angry feelings. 
Specifically, individuals who feel angry may think about other negative 
events or perform negative behaviors to release their angry feelings, at 
least for a brief time following the anger-inducing event (e.g., Baron, 
1972; Baron & Bell, 1975). Alternatively, anger may be located concep­
tually on a continuum of controlled to automatic maintenance, some­
where between positive feelings and sadness. Anger may be more automa­
tically maintained than feelings of sadness, especially for those who have 
not learned to control their angry feelings. Finally, anger may simply pro­
duce stronger negative feelings than sadness or shame, making it much 
more difficult to behave or think positively. 
Thus, one perspective on the effects of negative mood state on the re­
call results of this study is to view the bribe condition as producing feelings 
better described as anger than as sadness. Subjects temporarily maintained 
their angry feelings, either automatically or purposefully (to release 
them). Consequently, their negative quality influenced the content of 
thought, including retrieval of negative words. This interpretation may be 
contrasted with predictions regarding sad mood states evoked by manipu­
lations that are not bribe-oriented. Implications of these findings about the 
effect of negative mood states should be considered on a cautionary note, 
of course, since our findings about negative feelings were substantially 
smaller than the findings regarding the effect of positive mood state on 
memory. However, this perspective does contribute testable implications 
for individual differences in mood effects on memory, determined perhaps 
by the degree of anger or sadness that individuals feel in a common situ­
ation. 
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